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Generalized rank weights of reducible codes,
optimal cases and related properties
Umberto Martı´nez-Pen˜as, Student Member, IEEE,
Abstract—Reducible codes for the rank metric were introduced
for cryptographic purposes. They have fast encoding and decod-
ing algorithms, include maximum rank distance (MRD) codes
and can correct many rank errors beyond half of their minimum
rank distance, which makes them suitable for error-correction in
network coding. In this paper, we study their security behaviour
against information leakage on networks when applied as coset
coding schemes, giving the following main results: 1) we give
lower and upper bounds on their generalized rank weights
(GRWs), which measure worst-case information leakage to the
wire-tapper, 2) we find new parameters for which these codes
are MRD (meaning that their first GRW is optimal), and use
the previous bounds to estimate their higher GRWs, 3) we show
that all linear (over the extension field) codes whose GRWs are
all optimal for fixed packet and code sizes but varying length
are reducible codes up to rank equivalence, and 4) we show that
the information leaked to a wire-tapper when using reducible
codes is often much less than the worst case given by their
(optimal in some cases) GRWs. We conclude with some secondary
related properties: Conditions to be rank equivalent to cartesian
products of linear codes, conditions to be rank degenerate, duality
properties and MRD ranks.
Index Terms—Generalized rank weight, rank-metric codes,
rank distance, rank equivalent codes, reducible codes, secure
network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
L INEAR network coding was first studied in [1], [14], fur-ther formalized in [12], and provides higher throughput
than storing and forwarding messages on the network. Two
of the main problems in this context are error and erasure
correction, and security against information leakage to a wire-
tapper, which were first studied in [3] and [4], respectively.
Rank-metric codes were found to be universally suitable
(meaning independently of the underlying network code) for
error and erasure correction in linear network coding in [22],
used as forward error-correcting codes, and they were found
to be universally suitable against information leakage in [23],
used in the form of coset coding. Both constructions can be
treated separately and applied together in a concatenated way
(see [23, Sec. VII-B]).
On the security side, generalized rank weights (GRWs) of
codes that are linear over the extension field were introduced
in [13], [18] to measure the worst-case information leakage
for a given number of wire-tapped links. Later, GRWs were
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extended in [21] and [17] to codes that are linear over the
base field, where they are called Delsarte generalized weights
and generalized matrix weights, respectively. We will use the
term GRWs for the latter parameters, which were also found
to measure the worst-case information leakage for codes that
are linear over the base field [17, Th. 3].
Gabidulin codes [8] constitute a family of maximum rank
distance (MRD) codes that cover all cases when the number
of outgoing links n is not larger than the packet length m, and
all of their GRWs are optimal (meaning largest possible).
Cartesian products of these codes are proposed in [23,
Sec. VII.C] for the case n > m both for error correction
and security against information leakage. A generalization of
these codes, called reducible codes, were introduced earlier in
[9] as an alternative to Gabidulin codes [8] to improve the
security of rank-based public key cryptosystems [10]. On the
error correction side, it was shown in [9] that reducible codes
have fast encoding and rank error-correcting algorithms, their
minimum rank distance is not worse than that of cartesian
products of codes [23, Sec. VII.C], being actually MRD in
some cases, and they can correct many rank errors beyond
half of their minimum rank distance (even in the MRD cases).
Therefore they seem to be the best known codes for error
correction in linear network coding when n > m.
However, on the security side, only the existence of codes
with optimal first GRW (MRD codes) has been studied in the
case n > m [17, Sec. IV-B], but no bounds nor estimates of
higher GRWs of rank-metric codes or other properties related
to their worst-case information leakage are known when n >
m, except for cyclic codes with minimal GRWs [7].
In this paper, we study the security provided by reducible
codes in linear network coding when used for coset coding as
in [23] by studying their GRWs and showing their optimality
in several cases. In particular, we study for the first time the
GRWs of a concrete family of rank-metric codes with n > m,
which moreover include MRD codes for several parameters.
A. Main contributions
Our main contributions are the following:
1) We give lower and upper bounds on GRWs of reducible
codes, and exact values for cartesian products, giving a
first step in the open problem of estimating or bounding
the GRWs of a family of rank-metric codes for n > m.
2) We give new families of parameters for which reducible
codes are MRD (some were given in [9]), meaning that
their first GRW is optimal and thus they are optimal
regarding zero information leakage among all linear
(over the extension or the base field) codes, by [17, Th.
23]. Using the estimates and exact values of GRWs of
these codes in the previous item, we also give a first step
in the open problem of finding the GRWs of a family
of MRD codes for n > m.
3) We show that all linear (over the extension field) codes
whose GRWs are all optimal for fixed packet and code
sizes, but varying length, lie in the family of reducible
codes from the previous item, up to rank equivalence.
4) Finally, we show that information leakage when using
reducible codes is often much less than the worst case
given by their GRWs. In particular, they often provide
strictly higher security than the known security provided
by other MRD codes [17, Sec. IV-B].
B. Organization of the paper
After some preliminaries in Section II, the paper is orga-
nized as follows: In Section III, we give lower and upper
bounds on the GRWs of reducible codes, extending the lower
bound on the minimum rank distance given in [9], and see
that the given upper bound on the minimum rank distance
can be reached by some reduction. In Section IV, we obtain
new parameters for which reducible codes are MRD (or close
to MRD) and with MRD components, and obtain explicit
estimates on their GRWs, including those MRD codes found
in [9] and considered for secure network coding in [23].
In Section V, we obtain all linear codes whose GRWs are
all optimal, for all fixed packet and code sizes, up to rank
equivalence. In Section VI, we see that the actual information
leakage occuring when using reducible codes is often much
less than the worst case given by their GRWs, providing higher
security than other known MRD codes. Finally, in Section VII,
we study secondary but related properties: Conditions to be
rank equivalent to cartesian products and conditions to be rank
degenerate. We study their duality properties and MRD ranks.
Finally, we propose alternative constructions to the classical
(u,u+ v) construction.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Rank-metric codes
Fix a prime power q and positive integers m and n, and let
Fq and Fqm denote the finite fields with q and q
m elements,
respectively. We may identify vectors in Fnqm with m × n
matrices over Fq: Fix a basis α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm over
Fq. If c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ F
n
qm , cj =
∑m
i=1 αici,j , and
ci,j ∈ Fq , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, we may
identify c with the matrix
M(c) = (ci,j)
1≤i≤m
1≤j≤n . (1)
The rank weight of a vector c ∈ Fnqm is defined as the rank
of the matrix M(c) and denoted by wtR(c). In this paper, a
code is a subset of Fnqm . The term rank-metric code is used
for codes with the rank metric.
B. Universal secure linear network coding
We consider a network with several sources and several
sinks as in [1], [14]. In this model, a given source wants to
transmit k packets in Fmq to one or several sink nodes, and
does so by encoding them into a vector, c ∈ Fnqm , which can
be seen as n packets in Fmq by (1), being n the number of
outgoing links from the source.
In linear network coding, as considered in [1] and [14], the
nodes in the network forward linear combinations of received
packets (see [12, Definition 1]), achieving higher throughput
than just storing and forwarding. This means that a given sink
is assumed to receive the vector
y = cAT ∈ FNqm ,
for some matrix A ∈ FN×nq , called a transfer matrix.
Two of the main problems in linear network coding consid-
ered in the literature are the following:
1) Error correction [3]: Several packets are injected on
some links in the network, hence the sink receives
y = cAT + e ∈ FNqm ,
for an error vector e ∈ FNqm .
2) Information leakage [4]: A wire-tapper listens to µ > 0
links in the network, obtaining
z = cBT ∈ Fµqm ,
for a matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq .
In [22], it is proven that rank-metric codes are suitable for
error correction when used as forward error-correcting codes,
and in [23], it is proven that they are also suitable to protect
messages from information leakage when used as coset coding
schemes, which were introduced in [25] and [19]. Both coding
techniques can be treated separately and applied together in a
concatenated way (see [23, Sec. VII-B]).
Moreover, rank-metric codes are universal [23] in the sense
that they correct a given number of errors and erasures,
and protect against a given number of wire-tapped links,
independently of the matrices A and B, respectively.
We consider the particular coding schemes in [23, Sec. V-B]
with uniform distributions:
Definition 1 ([23]). Given an Fqm -linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm with
generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm , we define its coset coding scheme
as follows: For x ∈ Fkqm , its coset encoding is a vector c ∈
Fnqm chosen uniformly at random and such that x = cG
T .
This type of encoding has been recently extended to Fq-
linear codes in [17, Sec. II-D].
In this paper we will focus on rank-metric codes used
for security against information leakage in the form of coset
coding.
C. Generalized rank weights and information leakage
The information leaked to a wire-tapping adversary when
using coset coding schemes was obtained in [23, Lemma 6],
then generalized in [13, Lemma 7] to Fqm -linear nested coset
coding schemes [26], and in [17, Prop. 4] to Fq-linear coset
coding schemes.
We need the concept of Galois closed spaces [24]:
3Definition 2 ([24]). Denote [i] = qi for an integer i ≥ 0. If
C ⊆ Fnqm is Fqm -linear, we denote
C [i] = {(c
[i]
1 , c
[i]
2 , . . . , c
[i]
n ) | (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C},
we define the Galois closure of C as C∗ =
∑m−1
i=0 C
[i], and
we say that it is Galois closed if C = C∗.
The next lemma is [23, Lemma 6]. Throughout the paper,
I(X ;Y ) denotes the mutual information of the random vari-
ables X and Y , taking logarithms with base qm.
Lemma 1 ([23]). Denote by S the uniform random variable
in Fkqm , X its coset encoding using an Fqm-linear code C ⊆
Fnqm according to Definition 1, and denoteW = XB
T , where
B ∈ Fµ×nq . Then
I(S;W ) = dim(C ∩ V ), (2)
where V ⊆ Fnqm is the Fqm-linear vector space with generator
matrix B.
Since Galois closed spaces in Fnqm are those Fqm -linear
spaces with a generator matrix over Fq [24, Lemma 1], the
previous lemma motivates the definition of generalized rank
weights, introduced independently in [18] for n ≤ m, and in
[13, Def. 2] for the general case:
Definition 3 ([13]). Given an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm
of dimension k, we define its r-th generalized rank weight
(GRW), for 1 ≤ r ≤ k, as
dR,r(C) = min{dim(V ) | V ⊆ F
n
qm ,Fqm -linear and
V = V ∗, dim(C ∩ V ) ≥ r}.
We also define dR,0(C) = 0 for convenience.
Hence dR,r(C) is the minimum number of links that a wire-
tapper needs to listen to in order to obtain at least the amount
of information contained in r packets. In other words, r − 1
packets is the worst-case information leakage when at most
dR,r(C)− 1 links are wire-tapped.
The next lemma corresponds to [11, Th. 16, Cor. 17]:
Lemma 2 ([11]). Given an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm of
dimension k and 1 ≤ r ≤ k, it holds that
dR,r(C) = min{wtR(D) | D ⊆ C,Fqm -linear and
dim(D) = r},
where wtR(D) = dim(D
∗) for an Fqm -linear D ⊆ F
n
qm .
In particular, it is shown in [13, Cor. 1] that dR,1(C) is
the minimum rank distance of the code C (also denoted by
dR(C)). Thus the minimum rank distance is of particular
importance, since it gives the maximum number of wire-
tapped links that guarantee zero information leakage, and we
may evaluate the code’s optimality among all rank-metric
codes (linear and non-linear) in this sense using the Singleton
bound [5, Th. 6.3]:
#C ≤ qmax{m,n}(min{m,n}−dR(C)+1), (3)
where C ⊆ Fnqm is an arbitrary rank-metric code. Codes
attaining this bound are called maximum rank distance (MRD)
codes.
D. Existing MRD code constructions
We briefly revisit two existing code constructions that have
already been considered in the literature:
1) Assume n ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ n: Take elements
β1, β2, . . . , βn ∈ Fqm that are linearly independent over
Fq. The Fqm -linear code CGab ⊆ F
n
qm generated by the
matrix 
β1 β2 . . . βn
β
[1]
1 β
[1]
2 . . . β
[1]
n
...
...
. . .
...
β
[k−1]
1 β
[k−1]
2 . . . β
[k−1]
n

has dimension k and minimum rank distance
dR(CGab) = n−k+1, and hence is MRD. These codes
are known as Gabidulin codes and were introduced in
[8]. Their GRWs were given in [13, Cor. 2]:
dR,r(CGab) = n− k + r.
2) Assume n = lm and k = lk′, for some positive integers
l and k′ ≤ m: The Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm defined
as C = C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl, where each Ci ⊆ F
m
qm is
a k′-dimensional Gabidulin code, has dimension k and
minimum rank distance dR(C) = m−k
′+1, and hence
is also MRD. These codes were introduced in [9, Cor. 1]
and considered in [23, Sec. VII-C] for secure network
coding. In contrast with Gabidulin codes, although a first
analysis of these codes is given in [23], their GRWs are
still not known. We will find all of them in Section IV-B.
The two previous constructions are particular cases of
reducible codes, introduced in [9], which we will study in
the rest of the paper.
In [17], MRD Fq-linear codes obtained by transposing the
matrix representations of codewords in a Gabidulin code are
proposed for the case n > m. However no exact values or
lower bounds are known for any code in this case (n > m).
E. Reducible codes and reductions
Consider positive integers l, n1, n2, . . . , nl and Fqm-linear
codes C1 ⊆ F
n1
qm , C2 ⊆ F
n2
qm , . . . , Cl ⊆ F
nl
qm of dimensions k1,
k2, . . . , kl, respectively. Consider matrices Gi,j ∈ F
ki×nj
qm , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , l and j = i, i+1, . . . , l, where Gi,i generates Ci.
Definition 4 ([9]). We say that an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm is
reducible with reduction R = (Gi,j)
i≤j≤l
1≤i≤l if it has a generator
matrix of the form
G =

G1,1 G1,2 G1,3 . . . G1,l−1 G1,l
0 G2,2 G2,3 . . . G2,l−1 G2,l
0 0 G3,3 . . . G3,l−1 G3,l
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . Gl−1,l−1 Gl−1,l
0 0 0 . . . 0 Gl,l

.
The length of the code C is n = n1 + n2 + · · · + nl and
its dimension is k = k1 + k2 + · · · + kl. C is the cartesian
product of the codes C1, C2, . . . , Cl if Gi,j = 0, for all j > i.
4Definition 5. For a given reduction R as in the previ-
ous definition, we define its main components as the codes
C1, C2, . . . , Cl, its row components as the Fqm-linear codes
C′i ⊆ F
n
qm with generator matrices
G′i = (0, . . . , 0, Gi,i, Gi,i+1, . . . , Gi,l), (4)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and its column components as the Fqm -
linear codes Ĉj ⊆ F
nj
qm generated by the matrices
Ĝj = (G1,j , G2,j , . . . , Gj,j)
T , (5)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , l, which need not have full rank.
It holds that ki = dim(C
′
i), k̂j = dim(Ĉj) ≥ kj , C =
C′1 ⊕ C
′
2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ C
′
l and C ⊆ Ĉ = Ĉ1 × Ĉ2 × · · · × Ĉl.
Different reductions always have the same main components
if their block sizes are the same. See Appendix A for a
discussion on the uniqueness of reductions of a reducible code.
III. BOUNDS ON GRWS OF REDUCIBLE CODES AND
EXACT VALUES
With notation as in Subsection II-E, it is proven in [9,
Lemma 2] that
dR,1(C) ≥ min{dR,1(C1), dR,1(C2), . . . , dR,1(Cl)}. (6)
We now present the main result of this section, which gener-
alizes (6) to higher GRWs and also gives upper bounds. As
observed below, it gives the exact values for cartesian products.
Theorem 1. With notation as in Subsection II-E, for every
r = 1, 2, . . . , k, we have that
dR,r(C) ≥ min{dR,r1(C1) + dR,r2(C2) + · · ·+ dR,rl(Cl)
| r = r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rl, 0 ≤ ri ≤ ki},
(7)
and
dR,r(C) ≤ min{dR,r1(C
′
1) + dR,r2(C
′
2) + · · ·+ dR,rl(C
′
l)
| r = r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rl, 0 ≤ ri ≤ ki}.
(8)
The proof can be found at the end of the section. We now
elaborate on some particular cases of interest.
First, observe that the bound (7) gives the bound (6) for the
minimum rank distance (the case r = 1), and the bound (8)
gives the following (immediate) upper bound:
dR,1(C) ≤ min{dR,1(C
′
1), dR,1(C
′
2), . . . , dR,1(C
′
l)}. (9)
The previous theorem also gives the following corollary for
cartesian products:
Corollary 1. If C = C1×C2× · · ·×Cl and 1 ≤ r ≤ k, with
notation as before, then
dR,r(C) = min{dR,r1(C1) + dR,r2(C2) + · · ·+ dR,rl(Cl)
| r = r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rl}.
(10)
Now we illustrate Theorem 1 with the following example
that includes the MRD Fqm-linear codes in Subsection II-D,
item 2, for l = 2:
Example 1. With notation as in Theorem 1, assume that l = 2,
n1, n2 ≤ m, k1 ≤ k2 and take C1 and C2 as MRD codes
(the matrix G1,2 can be arbitrary). In particular, dR,ri(Ci) =
ni− ki + ri [13] as in Subsection II-D, 1 ≤ ri ≤ ki, i = 1, 2.
We estimate dR,r(C) considering three cases:
1) Assume 1 ≤ r ≤ k1: The bounds (7) and (8) give
min{n1 − k1, n2 − k2}+ r ≤ dR,r(C) ≤ n2 − k2 + r.
2) Assume k1 < r ≤ k2 (if k1 < k2): In this case, in both
bounds in Theorem 1, it is necessary that r2 > 0. Hence,
these bounds coincide and give the value dR,r(C) =
n2 − k2 + r.
3) Assume k2 < r ≤ k: As in the previous case, now it is
necessary that r1 > 0 and r2 > 0, and thus Theorem 1
gives the value dR,r(C) = n− k + r, which is optimal
by the Singleton bound [13, Proposition 1].
Finally, it is natural to ask whether different reductions (see
Definition 4) may give different bounds in Theorem 1. In
Appendix A, we show that all reductions have the same main
components, thus (7) remains unchanged. We now show that
(9) can always be attained by some particular reduction. Other
cases where (8) may be attained by some reduction are open.
Proposition 1. With notation as in Subsection II-E, there exists
a reduction R = (Gi,j)
i≤j≤l
1≤i≤l of C such that the bound (9) is
an equality.
Proof. Assume that the minimum rank distance is attained by
wtR(c) = dR,1(C), for c ∈ C. It holds that c = c
′
1 + c
′
2 +
· · ·+ c′l, with c
′
i ∈ C
′
i , and c
′
i = xiG
′
i,i (recall (4)), for some
xi ∈ F
ki
qm and all i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
We may assume without loss of generality that x1 6= 0. We
just need to define Gi,i = Gi,i and choose matrices A1,j ∈
F
k1×kj
qm and Gi,j ∈ F
ki×nj
qm , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l−1 and i+1 ≤ j ≤ l,
such that the k × k matrix
A =

I A1,2 A1,3 . . . A1,l−1 A1,l
0 I 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 I . . . 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . I 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 I

satisfies that G = AG, where G is the generator matrix of C
corresponding to R = (Gi,j)
i≤j≤l
1≤i≤l, and
x1A1,j = −xj ,
for j = 2, 3, . . . , l. It is possible to choose such matrices
A1,j because x1 6= 0. Then c = (xA)G lies in the first
row component of the reduction R and hence dR,1(C) =
wtR(c) ≥ dR,1(C
′
1), implying the result.
We conclude the section with the proof of Theorem 1. We
need the following lemma:
Lemma 3. With notation as in Subsection II-E, define the sets
Ai = {0}
n1×· · ·×{0}ni−1×(Fniqm \{0})×F
ni+1
qm ×· · ·×F
nl
qm ,
5for i = 1, 2, . . . , l. For an Fqm -linear vector space D ⊆ F
n
qm ,
there exist subspaces D′i ⊆ 〈D∩Ai〉, for i satisfying D∩Ai 6=
∅, such that D =
⊕
D∩Ai 6=∅
D′i and D
′
i ∩Aj = ∅ for j > i.
Proof. We may prove it by induction on the number of indices
i such that D ∩ Ai 6= ∅. If such number is 1, the result is
trivial by taking D′i = D, since D = 〈D ∩ Ai〉.
Assume that it is larger than 1 and i is the smallest index
such that D ∩Ai 6= ∅. Define D˜ =
∑l
j=i+1〈D ∩Aj〉 6= {0},
and let D′i 6= {0} by one of its complementaries in D. It
follows that D′i ⊆ 〈D ∩Ai〉 and D
′
i ∩ Aj = ∅, for j > i.
Now, by induction hypothesis, D˜ has a decomposition as
in the theorem, which together with D′i gives the desired
decomposition of D.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove (7). Take an r-
dimensional Fqm-linear subspace D ⊆ C. With notation
as in Lemma 3, define Di ⊆ Ci as the projection of D
′
i onto
the i-th main component, for i such that D ∩ Ai 6= ∅. We
see that dim(Di) = dim(D
′
i), since D
′
i ⊆ 〈D ∩ Ai〉 and
D′i ∩ Aj = ∅ for j > i, and by collecting the preimages in
D∗ by the projection map of bases of D∗i , for i such that
D ∩Ai 6= ∅, we see that
wtR(D) ≥
∑
D∩Ai 6=∅
wtR(Di),
and the result follows by Lemma 2.
To prove (8), take a decomposition r = r1+r2+· · ·+rl, with
0 ≤ ri ≤ ki, for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and take Fqm -linear subspaces
Di ⊆ C
′
i with dim(Di) = ri and wtR(Di) = dR,ri(C
′
i). Then
define the Fqm-linear subspace D = D1 ⊕D2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Dl ⊆
C, which satisfies dim(D) = r. By definition, it holds that
D∗ = D∗1 +D
∗
2 + · · ·+D
∗
l . Hence
wtR(D) ≤ wtR(D1) + wtR(D2) + · · ·+wtR(Dl)
= dR,r1(C
′
1) + dR,r2(C
′
2) + · · ·+ dR,rl(C
′
l),
and the result follows again by Lemma 2.
Remark 1. Observe that the bound (8) is valid with the same
proof for a general Fqm -linear code that can be decomposed
as a direct sum of Fqm -linear subcodes C = C
′
1⊕C
′
2⊕· · ·⊕C
′
l .
Remark 2. In the general setting of Theorem 1, the same
result as in Corollary 1 holds whenever Ci and C
′
i are
rank equivalent (see Section V), for each i = 1, 2, . . . , l,
since in that case it holds that dR,r(Ci) = dR,r(C
′
i) for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , l and all r = 1, 2, . . . , ki.
IV. MRD REDUCIBLE CODES WITH MRD MAIN
COMPONENTS, AND THEIR GRWS
Among all GRWs, the first weight (the minimum rank
distance) is of special importance, as explained at the end of
Subsection II-C. Therefore, it is of interest to study the GRWs
of a family of MRD codes, that is, codes that are already
optimal for the first weight.
In this section, we find new parameters for which reducible
codes are MRD or close to MRD when n > m, extending the
family of MRD codes in [9] (see Subsection II-D), and then
give bounds on their GRWs and exact values in the cartesian
product case, using the results in the previous section. Hence
we give for the first time estimates and exact values of the
GRWs of a family of MRD codes with n > m. We will also
compare the performance of these codes with those Fq-linear
MRD codes obtained by transposing the matrix representations
of codewords in a Gabidulin code [17, Sec. IV-B].
A. Definition of the codes
Assume n > m and fix an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In view of
the bound (6), we will consider a reducible code Cred ⊆ F
n
qm
of dimension k whose main components C1, C2, . . . , Cl (with
notation as in Subsection II-E) have as similar parameters
as possible. This will allow to obtain reducible codes with
minimum rank distance as large as allowed by (3).
First we need the following parameters:
1) There exist unique l > 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ m− 1 such that
n = lm− t.
2) There exist unique k′ > 0 and 0 ≤ s ≤ l − 1 such that
k = lk′ − s.
3) Define then
a =
⌈
km
n
⌉
− k′, and b =
⌈
t
l
⌉
− 1.
4) Finally, define
t′ = l(m− b)− n,
which satisfies 0 < t′ ≤ l.
We need the next inequalities to define the desired codes:
Lemma 4. It holds that k′ ≤ m− b if b ≥ 0, and k′ ≤ m if
b = −1.
Proof. For b = −1, we have that t = 0 and k = lk′ − s ≤
n = lm implies that k′ ≤ m + s/l. Since s < l, the result
holds in this case.
Now assume that b ≥ 0. We have that k+s ≤ n+l. Writing
k and n as above, this inequality reads
(lk′ − s) + s ≤ (lm− t) + l,
that is, lk′ + t ≤ l(m+ 1) and, dividing by l, it is equivalent
to
k′ +
t
l
− 1 ≤ m.
The result follows by the definition of b.
Finally, we give the construction, distinguishing three cases:
Definition 6. Define the reducible code Cred ⊆ F
n
qm of
dimension k with MRD main components C1, C2, . . . , Cl as
follows:
1) If t = 0 (i.e. b = −1): Choose C1, C2, . . . , Cl such that
l− s of them have length m and dimension k′, and s of
them have length m and dimension k′ − 1. By (6), we
have that
dR,1(Cred) ≥ m− k
′ + 1.
2) If t > 0 and t′ ≤ s: Choose C1, C2, . . . , Cl such that
l−s of them have length m−b and dimension k′, s− t′
6of them have length m − b and dimension k′ − 1, and
t′ of them have length m− b− 1 and dimension k′− 1.
By (6), we have that
dR,1(Cred) ≥ m− b− k
′ + 1.
3) If t > 0 and t′ > s: Choose C1, C2, . . . , Cl such that
l−t′ of them have length m−b and dimension k′, t′−s
of them have length m − b − 1 and dimension k′, and
s of them have length m− b− 1 and dimension k′ − 1.
By (6), we have that
dR,1(Cred) ≥ m− b− k
′.
The next theorem is the first main result of this section, and
it gives families of parameters m, n and k such that Cred is
MRD or almost MRD:
Theorem 2. Assume that 0 ≤ t ≤ l or n ≥ m2. The following
holds:
1) If t ≤ s or tk′ > ms, then
dR,1(Cred) =
⌊m
n
(n− k) + 1
⌋
,
attaining (3) if n divides mk.
2) If t > s and tk′ ≤ ms, then
dR,1(Cred) ≥
⌊m
n
(n− k)
⌋
.
Proof. First we see that we only need to assume 0 ≤ t ≤ l.
Assume that n ≥ m2. Since n = lm− t ≥ m2 and t ≥ 0, it
holds that l ≥ m. Therefore t ≤ m− 1 ≤ l − 1.
Next we observe that⌊m
n
(n− k) + 1
⌋
= m− a− k′ + 1. (11)
Before considering the different cases, we will see that a ≥
0, and a = 0 if and only if k′t ≤ sm.
First it holds that −1 < km/n− k′ if and only if
(k′ − 1)n < km.
Using that n = lm− t and k = lk′−s, and rearranging terms,
this inequality reads
sm+ (k′ − 1)t < lm+ n,
which is always true since s < l and k′t ≤ k ≤ n. Hence
a ≥ 0. On the other hand, km/n− k′ ≤ 0 if and only if
nk′ ≥ km.
Using again that n = lm− t and k = lk′− s, and rearranging
terms, this inequality reads k′t ≤ sm. This is then the case
when a = 0.
Now we prove item 1 in the theorem:
Assume first that t = 0, then dR,1(Cred) ≥ m− k
′+1 and
a = 0, hence the result follows in this case by (11).
Now assume that 0 < t ≤ s. Then dR,1(Cred) ≥ m−k
′+1
(since b = 0) and k′t ≤ sm holds, since k′ ≤ m. Then a = 0
and the result follows in this case by (11).
Next assume that tk′ > ms. Then we know that a ≥ 1 and⌊m
n
(n− k) + 1
⌋
≤ m− k′.
Since b = 0, we know that dR,1(Cred) ≥ m − k
′, hence the
result follows in this case by (11).
Finally, we prove item 2:
Assume that t > s and tk′ ≤ ms. Then we know that
a = b = 0 and dR,1(Cred) ≥ m− b− k
′. Therefore the result
follows also in this case by (11) and we are done.
Remark 3. Observe that the MRD reducible codes in Subsec-
tion II-D, item 2, are the subfamily of the codes Cred obtained
by choosing t = s = 0, and hence are particular cases of the
codes in the previous theorem.
Remark 4. Observe that the conditions 0 ≤ t ≤ l and n ≥ m2
only depend onm and n, but not on k. Hence, for the previous
families of values of n and m, we have obtained MRD or
almost MRD codes for all dimensions.
Remark 5. In general, the difference b− a will be big if t is
much bigger than l. As n grows, the fact t > l happens for
fewer values of t. Hence the codes Cred are far from optimal
when n is small compared to m (still n > m) and t is much
bigger than l.
B. Estimates and exact values of their GRWs
The next theorem is the second main result in this section,
and it gives estimates of the GRWs of the MRD (or almost
MRD) reducible codes Cred from Theorem 2, using the lower
bound (7).
Theorem 3. Let the parameters be as in Theorem 2.
Assume first that t ≤ s.
1) If 1 ≤ j ≤ l−s and (j−1)k′ < r ≤ jk′, or if l−s < j ≤
l−s+t and (j−1)(k′−1)+l−s < r ≤ j(k′−1)+l−s,
then
dR,r(Cred) ≥ j(m− k
′) + r.
2) If l − s+ t < j ≤ l and (j − 1)(k′ − 1) + l − s < r ≤
j(k′ − 1) + l − s, then
dR,r(Cred) ≥ j(m− k
′) + r + (j − l + s− t).
Assume now that t > s.
1) If 1 ≤ j ≤ t− s and (j − 1)k′ < r ≤ jk′, then
dR,r(Cred) ≥ j(m− k
′ − 1) + r.
2) If t−s < j ≤ l−s and (j−1)k′ < r ≤ jk′, or if l−s <
j ≤ l and (j−1)(k′−1)+ l−s < r ≤ j(k′−1)+ l−s,
then
dR,r(Cred) ≥ j(m− k
′) + r − t+ s.
These cases cover all r = 1, 2, . . . , k and moreover, if Cred is
the cartesian product of its main components C1, C2, . . . , Cl,
then all the previous lower bounds are equalities.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 1. To see it, we just
have to use that dR,ri(Ci) = ni−ki+ri and see in which way
we have to choose ri = 0 or ri > 0 to obtain the minimum
in the bound (7), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l. This is a straightforward
extension of the calculations in Example 1.
7C. Comparison with other MRD codes
In this subsection, we will compare the codes Cred ⊆ F
n
qm
from Definition 6 with the Fq-linear MRD codes C
T
Gab ⊆ F
n
qm
obtained by transposing the matrix represenations (see (1)) of
the codewords in a given Fqn -linear Gabidulin code CGab ⊆
Fmqn (see Subsection II-D), when n > m.
The codes CTGab were obtained previously by Delsarte [5,
Th. 6] and have been recently considered for universal secure
linear network coding in [17, Sec. IV-B].
We next argue the advantages of the codes Cred over the
codes CTGab:
1) Generalized rank weights: Although GRWs have re-
cently been extended to Fq-linear codes [21], [17] and its
connection to worst-case information leakage has been
obtained [17, Th. 3], little is known about them for codes
that are not linear over Fqm . In particular, the GRWs
of the codes CTGab are not known yet, except for their
minimum rank distance.
2) Encoding and decoding complexity: The complexity of
coset encoding and decoding with an Fqm-linear code,
as in Definition 1, is equivalent to the complexity of
encoding with one of its generator matrices.
If kred denotes the dimension of Cred over Fq, then the
complexity of encoding with a generator matrix coming
from one of its reductions is O(kredm
2) operations over
Fqm , whereas if kGab denotes the dimension of CGab
over Fq, then the complexity of encoding with one of
its generator matrices is O(kGabn
2) operations over Fqn .
Therefore it is a higher complexity since n > m, and the
difference between both complexities becomes higher
the bigger n is with respect to m.
3) Possible parameters obtained: Since the codes CTGab are
obtained from Fqn -linear codes, their sizes are of the
form qN , where N is some multiple of n, whereas the
sizes of the codes Cred are of the form q
M , where M
is some multiple of m.
Since we are assuming n > m, in a given interval
of positive integers, there are more possible parameters
attained by the codes Cred than by the codes C
T
Gab.
4) Stronger security: The information leakage for a given
number of wire-tapped links when using the codes Cred
is often much less than the worst case given by their
GRWs, as we will see in Section VI. In particular,
looking at their first GRW, we will see that more links
can be wire-tapped and still guarantee zero information
leakage when using Cred than when using C
T
Gab.
V. ALL Fqm -LINEAR CODES WITH OPTIMAL GRWS FOR
ALL FIXED PACKET AND CODE SIZES
In this section, we obtain all Fqm -linear codes whose GRWs
are all optimal for fixed packet and code sizes (m and k,
respectively), but varying length, n, up to rank equivalence.
These codes are particular cases of the codes Cred in the
previous section.
Definition 7. For fixed k and m, and for a basis
α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm over Fq , define the Fqm -linear code
Copt = C1 × C2 × · · · × Ck ⊆ F
km
qm , where all Ci are equal
and generated by the vector (α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈ F
m
qm .
To claim the above mentioned optimality of these codes, we
need the following bounds given in [16, Lemma 6]:
Lemma 5 ([16]). Given an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm of
dimension k, for each r = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, it holds that
1 ≤ dR,r+1(C)− dR,r(C) ≤ m. (12)
As a consequence, for each r = 1, 2, . . . , k, it holds that
dR,r(C) ≤ rm. (13)
Observe that these bounds only depend on the packet and
code sizes (m and k, respectively), and they do not depend on
the length n.
We first show that the codes Copt attain the previous bounds,
and then prove that they are the only ones with this property:
Proposition 2. Let Copt ⊆ F
km
qm be the Fqm-linear code in
Definition 7 for given k and m. Then dim(Copt) = k and
dR,r(Copt) = rm, for r = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Proof. It holds that dR,1(Ci) = m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, since
these codes are one-dimensional Gabidulin codes in Fmqm (see
Subsection II-D). Hence, by Corollary 1, we have that
dR,k(Copt) =
k∑
i=1
dR,1(Ci) = km.
By (12), it holds that dR,r(Copt) = rm, for r = 1, 2, . . . , k.
We will use the definition of rank equivalences from [16,
Def. 8], which are stronger than vector space isomorphisms
that preserve rank weights:
Definition 8 ([16]). If V ⊆ Fnqm and V
′ ⊆ Fn
′
qm are Fqm-
linear Galois closed spaces, we say that a map φ : V −→ V ′
is a rank equivalence if it is a vector space isomorphism and
wtR(φ(c)) = wtR(c), for all c ∈ V .
We say that two codes C and C′ are rank equivalent if there
exists a rank equivalence between Fqm-linear Galois closed
spaces V and V ′ that contain C and C′, respectively, and
mapping bijectively C to C′.
Finally, we show that the codes Copt are the only Fqm-linear
codes attaining (13) for fixed packet and code sizes up to rank
equivalence:
Theorem 4. Let C ⊆ Fnqm be an Fqm-linear code of dimension
k such that dR,r(C) = rm, for every r = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Then, for every basis α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm over Fq, the
code C is rank equivalent to the code Copt ⊆ F
km
qm in
Definition 7. Moreover, the rank equivalence can be explicitly
constructed in polynomial time from any basis of C.
We need some preliminary lemmas to prove this result. We
start by the following characterization of rank equivalences,
which is a particular case of [16, Th. 5]:
Lemma 6 ([16]). Let φ : V −→ V ′ be an Fqm-linear vector
space isomorphism, where V ⊆ Fnqm and V
′ ⊆ Fn
′
qm are Fqm-
linear Galois closed spaces.
8It is a rank equivalence if and only if there exist bases
v1,v2, . . . ,vt ∈ F
n
q and w1,w2, . . . ,wt ∈ F
n′
q of V and
V ′, respectively, and a non-zero element β ∈ Fqm , such that
φ(vi) = βwi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
We now introduce some notation. For a given vector c =
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ F
n
qm , define c
[i] = (c
[i]
1 , c
[i]
2 , . . . , c
[i]
n ), for all
integers i ≥ 0. Then define the trace map Tr : Fnqm −→ F
n
q of
the extension Fq ⊆ Fqm as follows
Tr(c) = c+ c[1] + c[2] + · · ·+ c[m−1],
for all c ∈ Fnqm . We have the following two lemmas:
Lemma 7. For a basis α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm over Fq , the
matrix A = (α
[j−1]
i )1≤i,j≤m over Fqm is invertible.
Proof. Well-known. See for instance [8].
Lemma 8. For a basis α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm over Fq and
the matrix A = (α
[j−1]
i )1≤i,j≤m, define
(β1, β2, . . . , βm) = e1A
−1,
where e1 ∈ F
m
qm is the first vector in the canonical basis. Then
β1, β2, . . . , βm is also a basis of Fqm over Fq .
Moreover, if B = (β
[j−1]
i )1≤i,j≤m, then
(α1, α2, . . . , αm) = e1B
−1.
Proof. Write β = (β1, β2, . . . , βm). Then βA = e1, which
means that
∑m
i=1 βiα
[j−1]
i = δj,1, where δ is the Kronecker
delta. By raising this equation to the power [l−1] = ql−1 and
using that δj,l is 0 or 1, we see that
∑m
i=1 β
[l−1]
i α
[j−1]
i = δj,l,
that is, β[l−1]A = el, for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Let λ ∈ Fmq be such that λ ·β = 0. By raising this equation
to the power [l−1], for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we see that λ·β[l−1] =
0 or, equivalently, λ · (elA
−1) = 0, since λ ∈ Fmq .
Write µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µm) = λ(A
−1)T . It holds that
0 = λ · (elA
−1) = (λ(A−1)T ) · el = µ · el = µl,
for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Therefore, µ = 0, thus λ = 0. Hence the
elements β1, β2, . . . , βm are linearly independent over Fq .
Finally, since
∑m
i=1 β
[l−1]
i α
[j−1]
i = δj,l, it holds that∑m
i=1 αiβ
[j−1]
i = δ1,j = δj,1, which means that
(α1, α2, . . . , αm)B = e1, and we are done.
We may now prove Theorem 4:
Proof of Theorem 4. Choose any basis b1,b2, . . . ,bk of C.
Since dim(C∗) = km and C∗ is generated by the elements
b
[j−1]
s , for s = 1, 2, . . . , k and j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, it follows that
these elements are linearly independent over Fqm .
Define the vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βm) = e1A
−1,
with notation as in the previous lemma. By that lemma,
β1, β2, . . . , βm constitute a basis of Fqm over Fq, and
(α1, α2, . . . , αm) = e1B
−1.
Consider the vectors vs,i = Tr(βibs) ∈ F
n
q , for s =
1, 2, . . . , k and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Assume that there exist
λs,i ∈ Fq such that
∑k
s=1
∑m
i=1 λs,ivs,i = 0. Then it holds
that
m∑
j=1
k∑
s=1
(
m∑
i=1
λs,iβ
[j−1]
i
)
b[j−1]s = 0.
Hence
∑m
i=1 λs,iβ
[j−1]
i = 0, for s = 1, 2, . . . , k and j =
1, 2, . . . ,m, which implies that λs,i = 0, for s = 1, 2, . . . , k
and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Therefore, the elements vs,i, for s = 1, 2, . . . , k and
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, constitute a basis of C∗ and are vectors
in Fnq . Now define the Fqm-linear vector space isomorphism
ψ : C∗ −→ Fkmqm by ψ(vs,i) = e(s−1)m+i, for s = 1, 2, . . . , k
and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. By Lemma 6, ψ is a rank equivalence
and, moreover,
bs =
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
αiβ
[j−1]
i b
[j−1]
s =
m∑
i=1
αiTr(βibs) =
m∑
i=1
αivs,i.
It follows that vs = ψ(bs) =
∑m
i=1 αie(s−1)m+i, and the
vectors vs, for s = 1, 2, . . . , k, constitute a basis of ψ(C).
Finally, this means that ψ(C) = Copt and we are done.
Remark 6. As explained in Subsection II-B, given an Fqm-
linear code C ⊆ Fnqm of dimension k, the parameter m
represents the packet length, k represents the number of
linearly independent packets that we may send using C, or
its size, and n represents the number of outgoing links from
the source.
Due to the bounds (13), if m and k are fixed and n is
not restricted, then the code Copt is the only Fqm-linear code
whose GRWs are all optimal, and hence is the only Fqm -linear
optimal code regarding information leakage in the network, up
to rank equivalence.
Remark 7. The codes Copt ⊆ F
km
qm do not only have optimal
GRWs, but the difference between two consecutive weights is
the largest possible by (12):
dR,r+1(Copt) = dR,r(Copt) +m,
for r = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. However, for a Gabidulin code CGab
as in Subsection II-D, the difference between two consecutive
weights is the smallest possible by (12):
dR,r+1(CGab) = dR,r(CGab) + 1,
for r = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
Therefore, when using Copt, an adversary that obtains r
packets of information, by listening to the smallest possible
number of links, needs to listen to at least m more links
in order to obtain one more packet of information. However,
when using CGab, the adversary only needs to listen to one
more link to obtain one more packet of information.
VI. STRONGER SECURITY OF REDUCIBLE CODES
On the error correction side, it is well-known that reducible
codes can correct a substantial amount of rank errors beyond
half of their minimum rank distance [9, Sec. III.A].
The aim of this section is to show that, on the security
side, when using a reducible code C, an eavesdropper may in
many cases obtain less than r packets of information even if
he or she wire-taps at least dR,r(C) links in the network (see
Subsection II-C).
Setting r = 1 and using an MRD reducible code (as in
Section IV-A), this means that the eavesdropper obtains no
information even when wire-tapping strictly more links than
9those allowed by other MRD codes (Fqm-linear or Fq-linear),
by [17, Th. 3].
The above mentioned stronger security is obtained by upper
bounding the dimensions of the code intersected with Galois
closed spaces, due to Equation (2). We explain this in the
remarks at the end of the section.
The following is the main result of this section, where we
denote by pii : F
n
qm −→ F
ni
qm the projection map onto the
coordinates corresponding to the i-th main component Ci ⊆
Fniqm , for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, with notation as in Subsection II-E.
Theorem 5. Let V ⊆ Fnqm be an Fqm-linear Galois closed
space and assume that, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , l, there exists
0 ≤ ri ≤ ki such that dim(pii(V )) ≤ dR,ri(Ci), with notation
as in Subsection II-E. Then
dim(C ∩ V ) ≤
(
l∑
i=1
ri
)
−#{i | dim(pii(V )) < dR,ri(Ci)}.
In particular, if dim(pii(V )) < dR,1(Ci), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l,
then
dim(C ∩ V ) = 0.
Before proving this theorem, we give two consequences of
interest. In the first, we give a sufficient condition for the
eavesdropper to obtain less than r packets of information, for
a given r, as in the second paragraph of this section:
Corollary 2. Let the notation be as in Subsection II-E, let
1 ≤ r ≤ k and let V ⊆ Fnqm be an Fqm-linear Galois closed
space. Assume that r =
∑l
i=1 ri, where 1 ≤ ri ≤ ki and
dim(pii(V )) ≤ dR,ri(Ci), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and for some j
it holds that dim(pij(V )) < dR,rj (Cj). Then
dim(C ∩ V ) < r.
The second consequence is just the previous theorem ap-
plied to the codes in Definition 7:
Corollary 3. Let Copt ⊆ F
km
qm be the code in Definition 7, and
let V ⊆ Fkmqm be an Fqm-linear Galois closed space. Then
dim(Copt ∩ V ) ≤ #{i | pii(V ) = F
m
qm}.
Finally, we prove Theorem 5. We need the following lemma:
Lemma 9. Let V ⊆ Fnqm be an Fqm -linear Galois closed
space, and let the notation be as in Subsection II-E. It holds
that
dim(C ∩ V ) ≤
l∑
i=1
dim(Ci ∩ pii(V )).
Proof. Let D = C ∩ V ⊆ C and let the notation be as in
Lemma 3. Since D =
⊕
D∩Ai 6=∅
D′i, we just need to show
that dim(D′i) ≤ dim(Ci∩pii(V )), for i such that D∩Ai 6= ∅.
Fix such an index i, and let ρi : D
′
i −→ Ci ∩ pii(V ) be the
restriction of pii to D
′
i. It is well-defined since pii(D
′
i) ⊆ pii(V )
by definition of D, and pii(D
′
i) ⊆ Ci since D
′
i ⊆ 〈C ∩ Ai〉.
Finally, we see that ρi is one to one since D
′
i ⊆ 〈C ∩ Ai〉
and D′i ∩ Aj = ∅ for j > i, and we are done.
Proof of Theorem 5. First observe that pii(V ) ⊆ F
ni
qm is again
Galois closed, for i = 1, 2, . . . , l. By definition of GRWs, if
dim(pii(V )) < dR,ri(Ci), then dim(Ci ∩ pii(V )) < ri, for
i such that ri > 0. On the other hand, if dim(pii(V )) ≤
dR,ri(Ci) and ri < ki, then by monotonicity of GRWs
[13, Lemma 4], it holds that dim(pii(V )) < dR,ri+1(Ci),
which implies that dim(Ci ∩ pii(V )) < ri + 1, that is,
dim(Ci ∩ pii(V )) ≤ ri. Finally, if dim(pii(V )) ≤ dR,ki(Ci),
then it is trivial that dim(Ci ∩ pii(V )) ≤ dim(Ci) = ki.
The result follows then from the previous lemma.
Remark 8. In the situation of Corollary 2, if dim(pii(V )) ≤
dR,ri(Ci), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l and with strict inequality for
some j, then an eavesdropper that obtains cBT , where B
generates V , gains less than r packets of information about
the original packets by Equation (2).
Observe that the previous condition implies that dim(V ) <∑l
i=1 dR,ri(Ci). We know from the bound (7) that if
dim(V ) <
∑l
i=1 dR,si(Ci) for all possible decompositions
r =
∑l
i=1 si, then dim(C ∩ V ) < r.
However, many Fqm -linear Galois closed spaces may satisfy
dim(pii(V )) < dR,ri(Ci), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and a given
decomposition r =
∑l
i=1 ri, but may also satisfy dim(V ) ≥∑l
i=1 dR,si(Ci) for some other decomposition r =
∑l
i=1 si.
Take for instance V = V1 × V2 × · · · × Vl, where Vi ⊆
Fniqm are Fqm -linear Galois closed spaces satisfying dim(Vi) ≤
dR,ri(Ci), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l and with strict inequality for
some j, but dim(V ) =
∑l
i=1 dim(Vi) ≥ dR,r(C).
Remark 9. In the particular case of Corollary 3, to obtain at
least r packets of information, it must hold that pii(V ) is the
whole space Fmqm for at least r indices i. Take for instance
V = V1×V2× · · ·×Vk, where Vi ( F
n
qm satisfies dim(Vi) =
m− 1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. In that case, dim(V ) = k(m− 1),
which is usually much bigger than dR,1(C) = m. However,
the adversary still obtains no information about the original
packets.
VII. RELATED PROPERTIES OF REDUCIBLE CODES
In this section, we study some secondary properties of
reducible codes that are related to their GRWs.
A. Cartesian product conditions
In this subsection, we gather sufficient and necessary con-
ditions for reducible codes to be rank equivalent to cartesian
products (see Section V for the definition of rank equivalence).
We start by using Galois closures and generalized rank
weights to see whether an Fqm -linear code that can be de-
composed as a direct sum of smaller codes is rank equivalent
to the cartesian product of these codes. It can be seen as a
converse statement to Corollary 1.
Proposition 3. Given an Fqm-linear code C = C
′
1 ⊕ C
′
2 ⊕
· · · ⊕ C′l ⊆ F
n
qm , with ki = dim(C
′
i), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and
k = dim(C), we have that C∗ = C′∗1 + C
′∗
2 + · · ·+ C
′∗
l and
the following conditions are equivalent:
1) C is rank equivalent to a cartesian product C1 ×C2 ×
· · · × Cl ⊆ F
n
qm , where Ci ⊆ F
ni
qm is rank equivalent to
C′i, and the equivalence map from C to the product is
the product of the equivalence maps from C′i to Ci.
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2) C∗ = C′∗1 ⊕ C
′∗
2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ C
′∗
l .
3) dR,k(C) = dR,k1(C
′
1) + dR,k2(C
′
2) + · · ·+ dR,kl(C
′
l).
4) For all r = 1, 2, . . . , k, it holds that
dR,r(C) = min{dR,r1(C
′
1) + dR,r2(C
′
2) + · · ·+ dR,rl(C
′
l)
| r = r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rl, 0 ≤ ri ≤ ki}.
Proof. It is trivial that item 1 implies item 4 by Corollary 1.
It is also trivial that item 4 implies item 3, and items 2 and
3 are equivalent since dR,k(C) = dim(C
∗) and dR,ki(C
′
i) =
dim(C′∗i ), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, by Lemma 2.
Now we prove that item 2 implies item 1. Define Vi = C
′∗
i ,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and V = C∗. We may assume that C is not
rank degenerate, that is, V = Fnqm . Therefore, n = dim(V ),
ni = dim(Vi), for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and n = n1+n2+ · · ·+nl.
On the other hand, define a vector space isomorphisms ψi :
Vi −→ F
ni
qm , for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, by sending a basis of Vi
of vectors in Fnq to the canonical basis of F
ni
qm . It is a rank
equivalence by Lemma 6. Define Ci = ψi(C
′
i). Therefore, Ci
and C′i are rank equivalent by definition.
Finally, define ψ : V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vl −→ F
n
qm by
ψ(c1 + c2 + · · ·+ cl) = (ψ1(c1), ψ2(c2), . . . , ψl(cl)),
where ci ∈ Vi, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , l. It holds that ψ
maps vectors in Fnq to vectors in F
n
q and is a vector space
isomorphism. Hence, it is a rank equivalence by Lemma 6
and verifies the required conditions.
Corollary 4. With notation as in Subsection II-E, if Ci is
rank equivalent to C′i, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , l, then C is rank
equivalent to C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl.
Observe that the previous corollary states that Remark 2 is
actually implied by Corollary 1.
On the other hand, we may use the column components to
see wether C = C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl exactly. The proof is
straightforward:
Proposition 4. With notation as in Subsection II-E, the fol-
lowing conditions are equivalent:
1) C = C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl.
2) C = Ĉ.
3) ki = k̂i, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
4) For each j = 2, 3, . . . , l, the rows in Gi,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ j−1,
are contained in the main component Cj .
B. Rank degenerate conditions
Recall the definition of rank degenerate codes from [16,
Def. 9]:
Definition 9 ([16]). An Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm of dimen-
sion k is rank degenerate if dR,k(C) < n.
In network coding, a code is rank degenerate if it can be
applied to a network with strictly less outgoing links from the
source node (see [11], [16] for more details).
In this subsection, we study sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for reducible codes to be rank degenerate.
Proposition 5. With notation as in Subsection II-E, it holds
that:
1) If C is rank degenerate, then there exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ l
such that Ci is rank degenerate.
2) If there exists an 1 ≤ j ≤ l such that Ĉj is rank
degenerate, then C is rank degenerate.
Proof. We prove each item separately:
1) It follows from
dR,k(C) ≥ dR,k1(C1) + dR,k2 (C2) + · · ·+ dR,kl(Cl),
which follows from Theorem 1, and the fact that C has
length n and Ci has length ni, for i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
2) We have that C ⊆ Ĉ. Hence C∗ ⊆ Ĉ∗ and
dR,k(C) = dim(C
∗) ≤ dim(Ĉ∗) = d
R,k̂
(Ĉ),
by Lemma 2, and
d
R,k̂
(Ĉ) = d
R,k̂1
(Ĉ1) + dR,k̂2 (Ĉ2) + · · ·+ dR,k̂l(Ĉl),
by Corollary 1, hence the item follows, using now that
Ĉj has length nj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , l.
Corollary 5. If C = C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl, then C is rank
degenerate if and only if there exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ l such that
Ci is rank degenerate.
C. Duality and bounds on GRWs
With notation as in Subsection II-E, it is shown in [9] that
the dual of the reducible code C has a generator matrix of the
form
H =

H1,1 0 0 . . . 0 0
H2,1 H2,2 0 . . . 0 0
H3,1 H3,2 H3,3 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
Hl−1,1 Hl−1,2 Hl−1,3 . . . Hl−1,l−1 0
Hl,1 Hl,2 Hl,3 . . . Hl,l−1 Hl,l

,
where Hi,i is a generator matrix of C
⊥
i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
We see that reversing the order of the row blocks does not
change the code, and reversing the order of the column blocks
gives a rank equivalent code. Hence, denoting by (C⊥)′i the
subcode of C⊥ generated by the matrix
H ′i = (Hi,1, . . . , Hi,i−1, Hi,i, 0, . . . , 0),
for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, we may obtain analogous bounds on the
generalized rank weights of C⊥ to those in Theorem 1. We
leave the details to the reader.
An upper bound on the GRW of C⊥ using column compo-
nents of C that follows from Corollary 1 is the following:
Proposition 6. With notation as in Subsection II-E, it holds
that
dR,r(C
⊥) ≤ min{dR,r̂1(Ĉ
⊥
1 ) + dR,r̂2(Ĉ
⊥
2 ) + · · ·+ dR,r̂l(Ĉ
⊥
l )
| r = r̂1 + r̂2 + · · ·+ r̂l, 0 ≤ r̂i ≤ k̂i},
(14)
for r = 1, 2, . . . , n− k̂ (observe that n− k̂ ≤ n− k).
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Proof. It holds that C ⊆ Ĉ , hence Ĉ⊥ ⊆ C⊥, and the result
follows then from Corollary 1 and the fact that Ĉ⊥ = Ĉ⊥1 ×
Ĉ⊥2 × · · · × Ĉ
⊥
l .
In particular, if k̂ < n, it holds that
dR,1(C
⊥) ≤ min{dR,1(Ĉ
⊥
1 ), dR,1(Ĉ
⊥
2 ), . . . , dR,1(Ĉ
⊥
l )}.
(15)
D. MRD rank
Recall from [13, Prop. 1] the (classical) Singleton bound on
GRWs:
dR,r(C) ≤ n− k + r, (16)
for any Fqm -linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm , where k = dim(C) and
1 ≤ r ≤ k. By monotonicity of GRWs [13, Lemma 4], if the
r-th weight of C attains the Singleton bound, then the s-th
weight of C also attains it, for all s ≥ r. The minimum of
such r is called the MRD rank of the code [6, Def. 1]:
Definition 10 ([6]). For an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm of
dimension k, we define its MRD rank as the minimum positive
integer r such that dR,r(C) = n−k+r, and denote it by r(C).
If dR,k(C) < n, then we define r(C) = k + 1.
Observe that the last part of the previous definition is
a redefinition of rank degenerate codes. We have the next
characterization of r(C) given in [6, Cor. III.3]:
Lemma 10 ([6]). For an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
n
qm of
dimension k, it holds that
r(C) = k − dR,1(C
⊥) + 2,
defining dR,1({0}) = n+ 1 for the case C = F
n
qm .
In particular, from the bounds obtained so far, we derive the
following result on the MRD rank of a reducible code:
Proposition 7. Let the notation be as in Subsection II-E. It
holds that
k−r(C) ≥ min{k1−r(C1), k2−r(C2), . . . , kl−r(Cl)} (17)
and
k − r(C) ≤ min{k̂1 − r(Ĉ1), k̂2 − r(Ĉ2), . . . , k̂l − r(Ĉl)}.
(18)
Moreover, denote by ki,j and ri,j the dimension and MRD
rank of the Fqm-linear code with parity check matrix Hi,j ,
respectively, with notation as in the previous subsection, for
i = 2, 3, . . . , l and j = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1. Then
k − r(C) ≤ min{ki − r(Ci) +
∑
Hi,j 6=0
(ki,j − ri,j + 2)
| i = 1, 2, . . . , l}.
(19)
Proof. The bound (17) follows from the previous lemma and
the bound (6). The bound (18) follows from the previous
lemma and the bound (15).
Now we prove the bound (19). From the previous lemma
and the bound (9), we obtain that
k − r(C) ≤ min{dR,1((C
⊥)′1, (C
⊥)′2, . . . , (C
⊥)′l)},
with notation as in the previous subsection. Now, if di,j
denotes the minimum rank distance of the Fqm-linear code
with parity check matrix Hi,j , it follows that
dR,1((C
⊥)′i) ≤ dR,1(C
⊥
i ) +
∑
Hi,j 6=0
di,j ,
and the result follows again from the previous lemma.
The MRD rank of the code C in Example 1 was obtained
directly using Theorem 1. However, it could be directly
obtained using the previous proposition.
We conclude with the cartesian product case:
Corollary 6. With notation as in the previous proposition, if
C = C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl, it holds that
k − r(C) = min{k1 − r(C1), k2 − r(C2), . . . , kl − r(Cl)},
and all the bounds in the previous proposition are equalities.
E. Particular constructions
To conclude, in this subsection we briefly recall some
constructions of reducible codes in the literature introduced to
improve the minimum Hamming distance of cartesian products
of codes, and see when they may give improvements for the
rank distance.
Recall the well-known (u,u + v)-construction by Plotkin
[20]. Take Fqm -linear codes C1, C2 ⊆ F
n
qm , and define the
Fqm-linear code C ⊆ F
2n
qm by
C = {(u,u+ v) | u ∈ C1,v ∈ C2}.
Denoting by dH(D) the minimum Hamming distance of a
code D, it holds that dH(C1×C2) = min{dH(C1), dH(C2)},
whereas dH(C) = min{2dH(C1), dH(C2)}, hence improving
the minimum Hamming distance of the cartesian product if
dH(C1) < dH(C2).
Observe that C is reducible. However, its first row compo-
nent is obviously rank equivalent to its first main component.
By Proposition 3, C and C1 ×C2 are rank equivalent. Hence
the (u,u+v)-construction gives nothing but cartesian products
for the rank metric.
We may apply the same argument for the so-called matrix-
product codes [2], which are a generalization of the pre-
vious construction. Let the notation be as in Subsection
II-E, fix a non-singular matrix A ∈ Fl×lqm and assume that
N = n1 = n2 = . . . = nl. Define the Fqm-linear code
C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cl)A ⊆ F
n
qm with generator matrix
G =

a1,1G1 a1,2G1 . . . a1,lG1
a2,1G2 a2,2G2 . . . a2,lG2
...
...
. . .
...
al,1Gl al,2Gl . . . al,lGl
 .
If A is upper triangular, we see that C is a reducible code.
Just as before, if A ∈ Fl×lq , then C is rank equivalent to
C1 × C2 × · · · × Cl, and thus this construction gives nothing
but cartesian products.
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In the following examples we see that, as an alternative, the
(u, αu+v)-construction, for α ∈ Fqm \Fq, and (u,u
[i]+v)-
construction, for 0 < i < m, may improve the minimum rank
distance of the cartesian product.
Example 2. Consider α ∈ Fqm \ Fq , n = 3, C1 ⊆ F
3
qm
generated by (1, 0, 0) and C2 ⊆ F
3
qm generated by (0, α, α
[1])
and (0, α[1], α[2]). Let C be the (u, αu + v)-construction of
the codes C1 and C2.
It holds that dR,1(C1 × C2) = 1, whereas dR,1(C) = 2.
Example 3. Consider α ∈ Fqm \ Fq , n = 3, C1 ⊆ F
3
qm
generated by (α, 0, 0) and C2 ⊆ F
3
qm generated by (0, α, α
[1])
and (0, α[1], α[2]). Let C be the (u,u[1] + v)-construction of
the codes C1 and C2.
Again, it holds that dR,1(C1×C2) = 1, whereas dR,1(C) =
2.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, we have studied the security performance of
reducible codes in network coding when used in the form
of coset coding schemes. We have obtained lower bounds on
their generalized rank weights (GRWs) that extend the known
lower bound on their minimum rank distance [9] and which
give exact values for cartesian products, and we have obtained
upper bounds that are always reached for the minimum rank
distance and some reduction. We have obtained maximum rank
distance (MRD) reducible codes with MRD main components
for new parameters, extending the families of MRD codes for
n > m considered in [9] and [23].
We have obtained all Fqm-linear codes whose GRWs are
all optimal, for all fixed packet and code sizes up to rank
equivalence. The given code construction is a cartesian prod-
uct of full-length one-dimensional Gabidulin codes and has
the minimum possible length required by the optimality of
their GRWs. As we have shown, these codes do not only
have optimal GRWs, but the difference between every two
consecutive GRWs is the packet lenght, which is optimal, in
constrast with Gabidulin codes, for which this difference is
the minimum possible. Thus if the length of the code is big
enough or not restricted, then the given construction behaves
much better than Gabidulin codes in secure network coding.
Afterwards we have shown that, when using reducible
codes, a wire-tapping adversary obtains in many cases less
information than that described by their GRWs. In particular,
when using MRD reducible codes or those with optimal GRWs
for fixed packet and code sizes, the eavesdropper obtains no
information about the sent packets even when wire-tapping
more links than those allowed by other MRD codes.
Finally, we have studied some secondary related properties
of reducible codes: Characterizations to be rank equivalent to
cartesian products of codes, characterizations to be rank degen-
erate, bounds on their dual codes, MRD ranks, and alternative
constructions to the well-known (u,u+ v)-construction.
To conclude, we list a few open problems of interest
regarding the security behaviour of reducible codes:
1) Find other cases when the bounds in Theorem 1 are
equalities, apart from the cases covered in Corollary 1
and Proposition 1.
2) Find new parameters for which reducible codes are
MRD, or prove the impossibility that a reducible code
is MRD for certain parameters.
3) Prove or disprove the optimality of the codes in Section
V among Fq-linear codes. We remark here that no sharp
bounds such as those in Lemma 5 are known for general
Fq-linear codes, to the best of our knowledge.
APPENDIX A
UNIQUENESS OF REDUCTIONS
In this appendix, we discuss the uniqueness of the main
components, row components and column components of a re-
ducible code (see Subsection II-E). We will show that the main
components remain unchanged by changing the reduction or
by rank equivalence, hence the bound (7) remains unchanged.
However, the row components may change by changing the
reduction, and the column components may change by a rank
equivalence. Hence the bounds (8) and (14) may change in
those cases. See Proposition 1, for instance.
Fix a reducible code C ⊆ Fnqm , with notation as in
Subsection II-E.
Proposition 8. Given another reduction R̂ of C with the same
row and column block sizes as R, it holds that the main
components and column components of R̂ andR are the same,
respectively.
Proof. Let R̂ = (Ĝi,j)
i≤j≤l
1≤i≤l and let Ĝ be the generator matrix
of C given by this reduction. Since the matrices Gi,i have full
rank, there exist matrices Ai,j ∈ F
ki×kj
qm , for i = 1, 2, . . . , l
and j = i, i+ 1, . . . , l, such that the k × k matrix
A =

A1,1 A1,2 A1,3 . . . A1,l−1 A1,l
0 A2,2 A2,3 . . . A2,l−1 A2,l
0 0 A3,3 . . . A3,l−1 A3,l
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . Al−1,l−1 Al−1,l
0 0 0 . . . 0 Al,l

satisfies that Ĝ = AG. Then it holds that Ĝi,i = Ai,iGi,i, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and the main components of both reductions
coincide. In addition, it holds that
Ĝ1,j
Ĝ2,j
...
Ĝj,j
 =

A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,j
0 A2,2 . . . A2,j
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Aj,j


G1,j
G2,j
...
Gj,j
 ,
and the column components of both reductions also coincide.
Proposition 9. Assume that the main components of the
reduction R of C are not rank degenerate. Let R′ be a
reduction of an Fqm -linear code C
′ that is rank equivalent
to C, with the same row and column block sizes as R, and
such that the rank equivalence maps the rows of the generator
matrix corresponding to R to the rows of the generator matrix
corresponding to R′. Then the main components and row
components of R′ and R are rank equivalent, respectively.
13
Proof. Let R′ = (G′i,j)
i≤j≤l
1≤i≤l and let G
′ be the generator
matrix of C′ given by this reduction. By hypothesis and by
Lemma 6, we may assume that the rank equivalence is given
by φ(c) = cA, for c ∈ Fnqm , for some n× n matrix
A =

A1,1 A1,2 A1,3 . . . A1,l−1 A1,l
A2,1 A2,2 A2,3 . . . A2,l−1 A2,l
A3,1 A3,2 A3,3 . . . A3,l−1 A3,l
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
Al−1,1 Al−1,2 Al−1,3 . . . Al−1,l−1 Al−1,l
Al,1 Al,2 Al,3 . . . Al,l−1 Al,l

,
with coefficients in Fq , and such that G
′ = GA. Looking at
the generator matrices of the last row components of R and
R′, we see that
(0, . . . , 0, G′l,l) = (Gl,lAl,1, Gl,lAl,2, . . . , Gl,lAl,l),
which implies that Gl,lAl,j = 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1. This
means that the columns of Al,j are in C
⊥
l . However, since
their coefficients lie in Fq, these columns have rank weight
equal to 1.
On the other hand, we are assuming that the main compo-
nents of R are not rank degenerate, which in particular means
that dR(C
⊥
l ) > 1 (see [11, Def. 26 and Cor. 28]). Therefore,
all the columns in Al,j are the zero vector, that is, Al,j = 0,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1.
If we now look at the generator matrices of the (l − 1)-th
row components of R and R′, we see that
(0, . . . , 0, G′l−1,l−1, G
′
l−1,l) = (Gl−1,l−1Al−1,1, . . .
Gl−1,l−1Al−1,l−1, Gl−1,l−1Al−1,l +Gl−1,lAl,l),
which implies that Gl−1,l−1Al−1,j = 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , l −
2. In the same way as before, we see that this implies that
Al−1,j = 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , l − 2.
Continuing iteratively in this way, we see that Ai,j = 0, for
i > j. In other words, we have that A is again of the form
A =

A1,1 A1,2 A1,3 . . . A1,l−1 A1,l
0 A2,2 A2,3 . . . A2,l−1 A2,l
0 0 A3,3 . . . A3,l−1 A3,l
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . Al−1,l−1 Al−1,l
0 0 0 . . . 0 Al,l

.
As in the proof of Proposition 8, this implies that the main
components and row components of R and R′ are rank
equivalent, respectively.
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